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Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization
Statutes: Reaching for a More Optimal Balance
Between Religious Freedom and Public Health
Timothy J. Aspinwall*

I. INTRODUcriON

State immunization laws expose a tension between society's
commitment to both religious freedom and public health. While each
of the fifty states requires children to undergo a standard set of
immunizations prior to entering school, forty-eight states grant
religious exemptions to this requirement.' Though exemptions are not
* B.A. 1983, University of Utah; J.D. 1986, Vanderbilt University; M.A. Religious
Studies 1995, University of Chicago; Academic Fellow, 1996, MacLean Center for
Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago.
I would like to thank the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics for the time and
resources necessary to complete this article. I would also like to thank Lainie Friedman
Ross, Ann Dudley Goldblatt, and Roland Hsu for their many helpful suggestions.
A separate and different article on the same topic, directed to the bioethics community,
authored by Lainie Friedman Ross and Timothy J. Aspinwall, appears in the Journal of
Law, Medicine and Ethics, Summer 1997, Vol. 25 No. 2.
1. See ALA. CODE §§ 16-30-1, 16-30-3 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15872(A)(1), 15-873(A)(1) (West 1996); Act effective Mar. 27, 1997, sec. 1, § 6-18702(a), 1997 Ark. Acts 871; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8263(d) (Deering Supp. 1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-4-1704(2), § 25-4-1704(4)(b) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10204a(a) (1995); Del. Dep't of Educ. Act of 1997, sec. 14, tit. 14 § 131(a)(2)(a)-(c),
131(a)(6) (1997); Act effective May 30, 1997, ch. 237, sec. 14, § 232.032(1),
232.032(4)(a), 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 237; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-771(b), 20-2-771(e)
(1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-4801, 39-4802(2) (1993); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-8.1(1),
5/27-8.1(8) (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-8.1-7-2(a), 20-8.1-7-9.5 (Michie
1995); IOWA CODE § 139.9(2), 139.9(4)(b) (Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 725209(a), 72-5209(b)(2) (Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 214.034(1), 214.036
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170(A)(1), 170(E) (West Supp.
1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6355(3) (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §
7-402(a)-(b), 7-402(d) (1997); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 76, § 15 (Law. Co-op. 1991);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.9215(2), 380.1177(l)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
MINN. STAT. § 123.70(1), 123.70(3)(d) (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.181(1)-(3) (Supp.
1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-403(l)-(3), 20-5-405(1)-(2) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 79-219 to 79-221 (Michie 1996); Education-Charter Schools Act, ch. 480, sec.
220, 1997 Nev. Stat. 392.437, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.435(1)(a)-(g), 392.437
(Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-C:20-a(I)-(II), 141-C:20-c(II) (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-9, 26:1A-9.1 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-5-2, 24-53(A)(2) (Michie 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7), 2164(9) (McKinney 1993 &
Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-155(a), 130A-155-157 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
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necessarily incompatible with corresponding general requirements, the
tension between public health and religious freedom arises from the
fact that the respective advocates for each often advance competing
policy objectives. Advocates for religious freedom will generally
favor exemptions to vaccination requirements, and public health
advocates will more often focus on the need to maximize the
immunization rate. 2 This division of policy objectives is driven
primarily by religious and public health interests that are motivated by
different values. Consequently, advocates for these competing
interests will frequently weigh the benefits and burdens of a given
policy very differently.
A common characteristic of religious values is that they are
developed around or inspired by a source of ultimate authority,
§ 23-07-17.1(1)-(3) (Supp.

1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.671(A),
3313.671(A)(3) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 1210.191(a), 1210.192
(1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267(1), 433.267(1)(c) (Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 13-1303a(a), 13-1303a(d) (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-38-2 (1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-29-180(A), 44-29-180(D) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 13-28-7.1, 13-28-7.1(2) (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-65001(a), 49-6-5001(b)(2) (1996); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.004(a),
161.004(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-301(1), 53A-11302(3)(c) (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1121, 1122(a)(3) (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §
22.1-271.2(A), 22.1-271.2(C) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
28A.210.080, 28A.210.090(2) (West Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.04(2),
252.04(3) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-309(a) (Michie 1997). A couple
of states recently repealed their laws granting religious exemptions for required
immunizations prior to entering school. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.30, 125 (repealed
1996); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 298-42(a), 298-44(2) (repealed 1996). West Virginia and
Mississippi are the two states that do not grant religious exemptions to the vaccination
requirement. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-3-4
(1995); CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, STATE IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS 1 (1993-94) [hereinafter STATE
IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS].

Diseases against which most states require vaccination for school children are
diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, measles, mumps, rubella, and polio. See STATE
IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. Seventeen states also grant philosophical objections to
childhood vaccination requirements. This essay does not address the issues attendant to
philosophical exemptions.
2. See American Health Consultants, Religion and Medicine Clash Over Deadly
Measles Epidemic, 7 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 41, 42 (1991) (discussing whether to
vaccinate children over parents' religious objection or permit parents to pursue other
strategies such as temporary isolation). The American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP"),
not surprisingly, gives priority to children's health, and takes a position that criticizes
vaccination exemptions and advocates for their repeal: "The AAP asserts that every
child should have the opportunity to grow and develop free from preventable illness or
injury." Commission on Bioethics, Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Religious Objections
to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 279 (1997). However, "[tihe AAP does not support
the stringent application of medical neglect laws when children do not receive
recommended immunizations." Id.
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something to which all else refers. 3 As a consequence, religious
beliefs and priorities are often more responsive to religious teachings
than to the social concerns and epidemiological data that motivate
public health advocates.4 This is not to suggest that religious teachings
do not share similar concerns with public health advocates-they often
do. Rather, religious believers and public health advocates often begin
with entirely different assumptions about what is ultimately good for
humanity. In the case of vaccination policy, these diverging starting
assumptions have led to sharp differences between public health
advocates and religious believers.
The central task of this Essay is to identify a policy that better
accommodates society's interest in both religious freedom and public
health. This Essay begins with a discussion of some specific tensions
between public health and religious freedom. 5 Next, the Essay sets
forth a brief review of Supreme Court rulings on state intervention into
the parent-child relationship, and the early precedent on vaccination
jurisprudence. 6 The discussion points out that improvements in public
health during recent decades are significant to a reasonable discussion
of vaccination policy. This Essay then addresses the question of
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 7 requires
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws that burden
religion.8 The discussion acknowledges the prevailing precedent that
religious exemptions to vaccination requirements are not
constitutionally mandated, but it demonstrates that legislative
exemptions are a reasonable accommodation, if the public health is not
seriously threatened by them. Discussion of precedent also shows that
religious exemptions are permissible under the Establishment Clause.9
However, exemption eligibility must be defined so broadly in order to
comply with free exercise standards that vaccination exemptions may
compromise the public health by reducing population immunity."
Finally, this Essay suggests that a more optimal balance between
3. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
4. See Larry May, Challenging Medical Authority: The Refusal of Treatment by
Christian Scientists, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15 (1995); MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE

AND HEALTH (First Church of Christ Scientist 1971) (1875).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part Ill.
7. The U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend.
1.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.
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religious freedom and public health can be achieved by implementing
programs that more efficiently administer voluntary childhood
vaccinations, while maintaining religious exemptions."
II. TENSIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM

Public health advocates worry about religious exemptions to
childhood vaccination requirements because exempt youth may
become infected and spread disease within exempt and nonexempt
communities.12 One example of this occurred in a 1994 multistate
measles outbreak that began when a religiously exempt Christian
11. See infra Part V.
12. The diseases targeted by vaccination requirements are characterized as follows:
Diphtheria is a toxin-mediated infection of the mucous membranes at sites including
the anterior nasal area, tonsils and pharynx, larynx, and outer skin. Diphtheria can
result in prostration, coma, or death. The fatality rate is approximately 20% in cases
involving persons under the age of five or older than forty. See CENTER FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
PREVENTION OF VACCINE-PREVENTABLE DISEASES 35-38 (William Atkinson et al. eds., 2d

ed. 1995) [hereinafter EPIDEMIOLOGY

AND PREVENTION].

Tetanus is an acute disease characterized by increasing muscle rigidity and spasms of
the jaw and neck muscles, becoming more generalized as the disease progresses. The
fatality rate is approximately 30%. See id. at 47-49.
Pertussis, or whooping cough, is an acute toxin-mediated infectious disease that causes
inflammation of the respiratory tract. The disease is characterized by attacks of rapid
coughing, during which the patient may become oxygen deprived. Brain damage from
oxygen deprivation can result. Pertussis can be fatal. See id. at 57-59.
Poliomyelitis is a viral infection most commonly affecting the spinal cord and cells of
the central nervous system. Approximately 95% of cases are subclinical, while less
than 1% are paralytic. The fatality rate for children infected with paralytic polio is 25%. See id. at 73-75.
Measles is an acute viral systemic infection. The disease is characterized by a fever of
102-105 degrees F., followed by a rash that begins at the hairline and moves downward
and outward to the hands and feet. Pneumonia is the most common serious
complication, occurring in approximately 6% of cases.
The fatality rate is
approximately 2/1000. See id. at 85-88.
Mumps is an acute viral infection that replicates in the nasopharynx and regional
lymph nodes, and it can spread to the salivary glands, testes, ovaries, pancreas, and
cerebral spinal fluid. The most common manifestations are swollen salivary glands and
headaches with stiff neck. Testicular swelling occurs in 20-50% of postpubertal males,
and ovarian inflammation occurs in approximately 5% of postpubertal females.
Deafness occurs in 1/20,000 cases. The fatality rate is 1-3.4/10,000. See id. at 101-04.
Rubella is a virus that infects the nasopharynx and regional lymph nodes, and it
spreads throughout the body. The disease is most commonly manifested in a rash that is
fainter than the measles rash. Arthritis or arthralgia lasting up to one month also occurs
in up to 70% of adult women. The most serious effect is Congenital Rubella Syndrome,
which can cause deafness, eye defects, cardiac defects, and nuerologic abnormalities for
infants infected during gestation. See id. at 111-14.
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Science high school student transported the disease from her Colorado
vacation site to her home in Illinois and boarding school in Missouri.
The disease then spread among persons both inside and outside of the
Christian Science community. 13 Additionally, instances of more
localized outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease demonstrate how
disease can spread geographically and between exempt and nonexempt
communities.4

Public health advocates strongly support comprehensive childhood
vaccination programs because these programs dramatically reduce
disease rates and can ultimately eliminate a disease from a given
population by reducing the number of vulnerable hosts. 15 However,
the ultimate success of these programs requires that the vaccination rate
within a population and its subgroups be sufficiently high to provide
effective population immunity. 16 This rate varies between eighty and
ninety-five percent, depending on the disease.' 7 Public health
advocates fear that vaccination exemptions may make it more difficult
to achieve population immunity.
Even though religiously exempt persons comprise a small portion of
the population, they often form concentrated communities that are
more vulnerable to disease, and often can transmit disease into the
larger nonexempt population. 18 Moreover, the general population is
13. See Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Serv., Interstate Measles Transmissionfrom a Ski Resort-Colorado 1994, 272 JAMA
1097, 1098 (1994); Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Serv., Outbreak of Measles Among Christian Science Students-Missouri and
Illinois 1994,43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 463,463 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Benita M. Jackson et al., An Epidemiologic Investigation of a Rubella
Outbreak Among the Amish of Northeastern Ohio, 108 PUB. HEALTH REP. 436 (1993);
Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Isolation
of Wild Poliovirus Type 3 Among Members of a Religious Community Objecting to
Vaccination-Alberta, Canada 1993, 269 JAMA 3104 (1993); Desiree V. Rodgers et
al., High Attack Rates and Case Fatality During a Measles Outbreak in Groups with
Religious Exemption to Vaccination, 12 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J.288 (1993);
Peter A. Briss et al., Rubella Among the Amish: Resurgent Disease in a Highly
Susceptible Community, 11 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 955 (1992).
15. See Roy Anderson & Robert May, Modern Vaccines, 335 LANCET 641, 642
(1990); see also Paul E.M. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 265, 265 (1993) (describing the benefits and limitations of
vaccinations within given populations).
16. See Anderson and May, supra note 15, at 642.
17. See id. at 641-42. The vaccination coverages necessary to block transmission
within a population are as follows: for measles and pertussis, 92-95%; mumps, 90-92%;
rubella, 85-87%; diphtheria and polio, 80-85%. See id. at 642.
18. See John Fox et al., Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to Public
Health Immunization Practices,94 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 179, 185 (1971). See generally
Paul Fine, Invited Commentary on "Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to
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vulnerable to the targeted diseases for two reasons. First, vaccinations
are less than one hundred percent effective. The efficacy rate for most
of the targeted diseases is approximately ninety-five to ninety-seven
percent.' 9 Also, there are indications that some vaccinations may lose
their efficacy over time, thus requiring vaccinees to obtain boosters to
retain their immunity.20 However, the second and more significant
reason for vulnerability within the larger population is that young
children remain seriously undervaccinated.21 This poor vaccination
rate puts children and the larger community at risk.22 Given that
vaccinations can significantly reduce or eliminate serious disease risks,
public health advocates may reasonably argue that exemption statutes
should be repealed. A forceful claim for such a position is that
protecting unvaccinated children and the general public from the
continuing risks of contagious disease is sufficiently important to
justify childhood vaccination requirements, religious interests
notwithstanding.
Advocates for religious freedom have a different view. Although
such advocates take positions as diverse and varied as religion itself,
they often will disagree with a public health priority claim to mandate
religiously objectionable vaccinations. 23 Religious advocates
Public Health Immunization Practices," 141 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY

185 (1995)

(commenting on the impact of and methodologies employed in the subject article).
19. The efficacy rate for vaccinations is as follows: for tetanus and polio, 100%;
diphtheria, 95%; measles, 93-98%; mumps and rubella, 90-97%; pertussis, 70-90%. See
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION, supra note 12, at 53, 79, 43, 97, 106, 118, and 63
respectively.
20. The duration of vaccination efficacy is as follows: polio, measles, mumps, and
rubella remain effective for life; diphtheria and tetanus remain effective for
approximately ten years; pertussis is approximately 50% effective at four to seven
years, and is ineffective at twelve years. See EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION, supra note
12, at 79, 96, 106, 118, 42, and 52 respectively.
21. See Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Serv., National, State, and Urban Area Vaccination Coverage Levels Among Children
Aged 19-35 Months-United States, April 1994-March 1995, 45 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 145, 145 (1996).

A recent survey shows that 75% of U.S.

children ages nineteen to thirty-five months have been fully vaccinated. Although this
is the highest rate ever achieved in the United States, it is still significantly lower than
the goal of a 90% rate of vaccination by 2000 set by the Center for Disease Control. See
id. at 146.
22. The Center for Disease Control attributed the 1989-1991 resurgence of measles in
the United States (an estimated 55,000 cases, 11,000 hospitalizations, and 130 deaths)
primarily to a low vaccination rate among preschool children. See Center for Disease
Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Reported VaccinePreventable Diseases-UnitedStates, 1993, and the Childhood Immunization Initiative,
43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 57, 58 (1994) [hereinafter Reported Vaccine-

Preventable Diseases].
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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reasonably can claim that the state has no moral authority to force
citizens to subordinate their religious beliefs to public health mandates
when the state has not done all it can do to advance the public health
through voluntary means. On this issue, religious advocates may
point out that more effective voluntary vaccination programs for
preschool children could improve the public health significantly. This
point must be taken seriously, given the fact that unvaccinated children
under the age of five form a significant portion of the victims of
vaccine-preventable diseases.24 On this basis, religious advocates can
make a strong argument that state policies that privilege public health
over religious interests are discredited by the state's failure to
maximize voluntary childhood immunizations, if more efficient
voluntary immunization programs would effectively suppress
contagious disease.
Religious advocates also may argue that eliminating exemptions
would permit the state to unfairly intrude upon parental rights to care
for and protect their children from harm. A primary point here is that
vaccinations may have serious adverse consequences.26 In defending
24. See supra note 22. The numbers of vaccine-preventable diseases in the United
States during 1992 and 1993 were as follows:
Total cases
Cases among children < 5 years old
1993
1993
1992
1992
0
0
I
Diphtheria
3
1,116
104
2,231
281
Measles
275
1,640
364
Mumps
2,485
3,753
2,261
3,935
6,335
Pertussis
0
0
0
Poliomyelitis
0
36
195
24
Rubella
157
1
0
44
43
Tetanus
See Reported Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, supra note 22, at 58.
25. The federal government is making efforts to increase the childhood vaccination
rate; however, political realities prevent the enabling legislation from being as
thorough as originally proposed. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
Individual states are also making efforts to increase the rate of voluntary vaccination.
For example, the Georgia Division of Public Health was able to increase the vaccination
rate of children served at all of the public health clinics in the state from 35% in 1987 to
80% in 1993. See Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Serv., Evaluation of Vaccination Strategies in Public Clinics-Georgia, 19851993, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 323, 323 (1995).
26. In 1991 and again in 1993, the Institute of Medicine released reports on the
adverse events associated with vaccinations. Evidence in the 1991 report indicates a
causal relation in the following instances: between diphtheria/tetanus/pertussis (DTP)
vaccination and anaphylaxis (6/100,000 for three doses), between DTP and protracted
inconsolable crying (.1%-6%), and between RAE 27/3 rubella vaccination and acute
arthritis (13%-15% among adult women). The evidence is consistent with a causal
relation between DTP vaccination and acute encephalopathy (up to 10.5/1,000,000),
between DTP and shock-like symptoms (between 3.5 and 291/100,000), and between
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the choice not to vaccinate, the religious advocate may point out that
the risk of the child becoming infected with a vaccine-preventable
disease is very small and that the parent should have the right to
choose between the risk of disease and the possibility of harm from
vaccine. This argument has particular force because parents are
permitted and even encouraged to engage in activities, such as driving
children to school, that present a greater risk of harm than the targeted
diseases.
Another important point that religious advocates may make is that
there can be punitive consequences for parents who fail to comply with
vaccination requirements. If there is no religious exemption, or if the
court finds that the parents' beliefs do not qualify for an exemption,
then the state may hold parents criminally liable for causing their
child's truancy because vaccination is a precondition for school
attendance.2 The religious advocate's claim here would be that if the
state requires vaccinations over parents' religious objections, it should
use enforcement mechanisms that do not require parents to choose
rubella vaccination and chronic arthritis (no reliable estimated frequency). See
Christopher P. Howson & Harvey V. Fineberg, Adverse Events Following Pertussis and
Rubella Vaccines, 267 JAMA 392, 395-96 (1992) (emphasis added).
Evidence in the 1993 Institute of Medicine report favors acceptance of a causal relation
in the following instances: between diphtheria/tetanus toxoid (DT/Td/T) vaccination and
Guillain-Barre syndrome (very rare), between DT/Td/T and brachial neuritis (.51.0/100,000 tetanus toxoid recipients), between measles vaccination and anaphylaxis
(very rare), and between oral polio vaccine (OPV) and Guillain-Barr6 syndrome (very
rare). This evidence establishes a causal relation in the following instances: between
D/Td/T and anaphylaxis; between measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccination and
thrombocytopenia, anaphylaxis, and death (all very rare); and between oral polio
vaccine (OPV) and paralysis and death (both very rare). See Kathleen R. Stratton et al.,
Adverse Events Associated with Childhood Vaccines Other than Pertussis and Rubella,
271 JAMA 1602, 1604-05 (1994) (emphasis added).
In response to the possibility of injury from required vaccinations, Congress
established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. See 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-13 (1991). The program permits persons to seek compensation from a
government fund if they suffer specified illnesses within a specified time of vaccination.
See id.
In the meantime, government advisory committees continue to recommend safer
vaccinations. A government advisory panel has recommended that an injection of
inactivated virus be used rather than the current oral vaccination with a live attenuated
virus. See U.S. Panel Proposes a Change in Administering Polio Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1996, at A8.
27. West Virginia immunization statutes provide for fines of ten to fifty dollars for
each instance in which a parent refuses to have his/her child vaccinated. See W. VA.
CODE § 16-3-4 (1997). For an example of a parent being fined for refusing to submit his
child to state mandated vaccination requirements, see Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816
(Ark. 1964).
28. See Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982).
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between their religious convictions and avoiding criminal penalty.
As the next section shows, states have not always done very much
to avoid imposing a choice between religious belief and secular law
when the public health is involved.
III.

EARLY SUPREME COURT VACCINATION JURISPRUDENCE

The earliest, most significant case in American vaccination
jurisprudence is Jacobson v. Massachusetts.29 In Jacobson, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the criminal conviction of a
Massachusetts man who refused to accept a legislatively mandated
smallpox immunization. The appellant unsuccessfully claimed that the
State violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses when the state gave the local
board of health power to require his vaccination, thereby denying him
equal protection by exempting children and not adults. 30 The Court
held that the state has police power to establish regulations reasonably
designed to protect the public health, and that it has the prerogative to
determine the means best suited to this objective. 3' Recognizing that
public health mandates may legitimately burden a person's individual
liberties, the Court noted that liberty "does not import an absolute right
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. '32 This principle remains
central to the state's police power to enact compulsory vaccination
laws in the interest of public health.33
The Supreme Court next commented upon the vaccination issue in
Zucht v. King,34 a case involving childhood immunization
requirements. In Zucht, a San Antonio, Texas girl argued that her
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection guarantees
were violated by city ordinances authorizing the board of health to
prevent her school attendance unless she received required
vaccinations. She claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because
it failed to provide "any safeguards against partiality and
oppression. 35 The Court reaffirmed its ruling in Jacobson by
dismissing her claim. The Court noted that Jacobson already had
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

197 U.S. 11 (1904).
See id. at 14.
See id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
260 U.S. 174 (1922).
Id. at 175.
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effectively answered all the constitutional questions presented by the
Texas case.36
Although Jacobson and Zucht involved due process and equal
protection claims rather than First Amendment religious freedoms,
they established the state's general authority to require immunizations
in the interest of public safety. The state's authority -set forth in
Jacobson was extended into the context of families and religious
freedom by the Court's 1944 ruling in Princev. Massachusetts.37 The
particular issue in Prince was whether a statute prohibiting childhood
labor violates free exercise or equal protection guarantees when applied
to proscribe a child's distribution of religious pamphlets. The Court
upheld the statute and sustained the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
woman for permitting her nine-year-old niece, of whom she had legal
custody, to sell religious pamphlets on the street in the evening. The
Court decided the case on the basis of religious freedom, finding that,
under the circumstances, equal protection guarantees are "another
phrasing" of free exercise protection. 38 The Court recognized both the
child's and the parent's religious freedom in the context of a family,
but it held that free exercise guarantees do not preclude regulation of
family practices in order to protect a child's well being.39 Taking note
36. See id. at 176.
37. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court's opinion in Prince set forth a concise review of
Supreme Court precedent on the issue of parents' rights to teach and encourage their
children to practice the parents' chosen religion, as well as the right of schools and
teachers to offer their services. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (finding a state violation of First Amendment by forcing students to
say the "Pledge of Allegiance" and by punishing parents for teaching their religious
prohibitions against reciting the pledge); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding a violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights for requiring
children to go to public rather than private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights are violated by laws that
restrict the teaching of foreign languages). The Prince opinion also set forth a Supreme
Court precedent that permitted Congress to intervene in family relationships. See
Prince, 321 U.S. at 164-66 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), rev'd on other grounds, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996) (holding that the First Amendment does not prevent Congress
from prohibiting polygamy and distinguishing between permissible regulation of
conduct and impermissible regulation of opinion or belief)).
38. Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. Immunization statutes have also been challenged on the
basis of privacy, equal protection, and due process. See, e.g., Hanzel v. Arter, 625 F.
Supp. 1259 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Itz v. Penick, 493 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1973). For an
additional discussion of due process and privacy claims, see Thomas E. Dover,
Comment, An Evaluation of Immunization Regulations in Light of Religious Objections
and the Developing Right of Privacy, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 401 (1979).
39. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. "But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the
public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty .... Acting to guard the general
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's
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of what it called the "crippling effects of child employment,"' the
Court stated that "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow [that] they are free ...to make martyrs of their
children . ..."" This phrase, used in conjunction with Jacobson, is
the central precedent for the prevailing rule in vaccination cases that
parents' religious freedom must give way to the state's interest in
protecting the public health and individual children.42 However,
factual distinctions give cause to question the utility of this precedent in
the contemporary vaccination context.
Jacobson, perhaps the most frequently cited vaccination case, was
decided during a time of dangerously high smallpox infection rates. 43
Today, vaccine-preventable disease rates are much lower and
vaccination rates are much higher." Thus, vaccination exemptions
present a much smaller health risk for individuals and society. This
fact makes it more reasonable to allow exemptions from generally
applicable vaccination requirements.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ACCOMMODATIONS
A First Amendment accommodation occurs when the state removes
a burden that is imposed upon religion by state action and thus permits
religious freedom that would not be present without the
accommodation. 4 5
In the vaccination context, religious
accommodation is manifested in exemptions from generally applicable
vaccination requirements. The next section discusses whether free
exercise requires religious exemptions to generally applicable laws.
The issue of whether and when discretionary legislative
control... " Id. (citations omitted).
40. id. at 168.
41. Id. at 170.
42. See Wright v. DeWitt, 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d
816 (Ark. 1964); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982); Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267
N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979). See generally
Maricopa County Health Dep't. v. Harmon, 750 P.2d 1364 (Ariz. 1987) (discussing
precedent suggesting compulsory immunization may be required despite parents'
religious objections, but failing to consider appellants' free exercise of religion
argument).
43. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905).
44. See supra note 21.
45. Religious accommodations, as discussed in this Essay, include both
accommodations that are constitutionally required under the Free Exercise Clause, and
those that are discretionary, whereby the state may choose to grant legislative
exemptions within the limits of the Establishment Clause. See Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 685, 686 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation].
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accommodations impermissibly advance or cause government
entanglement with religion is discussed under the section on
establishment.46
A. Free Exercise
The Supreme Court currently holds that the First Amendment
protects religion from state action directed at religion, but not from
burdens that are incidental to neutral, generally applicable laws. 47 This
interpretation of free exercise protections became law with the Court's
majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the
Court upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to two Native
American men who had been dismissed from their jobs for religiously
inspired peyote use during their period of employment. ' The two
men in this case, arguing as respondents, claimed that the law
excluding them from eligibility burdened their free exercise of religion,
and that they should, therefore, be exempt from its application unless
the state could show that the law was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. 49 The respondents sought support for their
position by citing the Court's holdings in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 50 and
Sherbert v. Verner"1 that, until Smith, had formed a centerpiece of free
exercise jurisprudence.
In Sherbert,the Court established the compelling interest test, which
required the State to justify laws or policies that burden fundamental
rights by showing that the state action serves a compelling state interest
by the least intrusive means. 52 The Court ruled that South Carolina
violated a Seventh Day Adventist woman's free exercise rights by
conditioning her eligibility for unemployment insurance compensation
upon her willingness to accept work on Saturdays, her Sabbath. 53 The
Court held that the denial of benefits constituted an indirect burden on
the woman's free exercise rights because she may have felt pressure to
abandon her religious practices: ' 4 Because the fundamental right of
religious freedom was burdened by this denial of benefits, the Court
46. See infra Part IV.B.
47. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990); Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
48. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
49. See id. at 878, 882-83.
50. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
52. See id. at 406-08.
53. See id. at 403-04.
54. See id. at 404.

1997]

Balancing Religious Freedom and Public Health

121

inquired whether the State had shown a compelling interest in the
employment law."
The State did not show that fraudulent
unemployment claims constituted a public threat, that any had actually
been filed, or that the rule in question was the least intrusive means of
preventing unemployment fraud. 56 Thus, the Court held that the
restriction on unemployment eligibility was a violation of First
Amendment free exercise guarantees.57
In Yoder, the issue before the Court was whether the Free Exercise
Clause mandated an exemption from a law requiring formal schooling
for children up to the age of sixteen in order to allow the Amish
community to provide schooling only at home for their children after
eighth grade. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed a Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision reversing the criminal convictions of certain
members of the Old Order Amish. 8 The Court found that the law
directly burdened the Amish religious practices, and therefore it
inquired whether there was a compelling state interest. 59 The Court
acknowledged the state's interest in universal education, but it found
that even this "paramount responsibility" must be balanced against the
fundamental rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 6 The Court
ruled that home-schooling provided by the Amish community satisfied
both the religious imperatives and the State's interest in ensuring that
children are properly educated.6 '
A distinctive feature of both Sherbert and Yoder is that the states
were required to justify either an indirect burden (denial of
unemployment benefits in Sherbert) or a direct burden (coerced
educational requirements in Yoder) by showing a compelling interest.
Given that religiously-objectionable vaccination requirements impose
both direct and indirect burdens (the threat of criminal prosecution for
contributing to a child's truancy and the denial of school entry) the
SherbertlYoder requirement of a compelling state interest would seem
to be directly applicable. This does not mean that application of the
compelling interest test would necessarily result in a free exercise right
55. Seeid.
56. See id. at 406-07. It was significant to the Court that South Carolina had
employment protection laws in place for Sunday sabbatarians. The State's willingness
to accommodate Sunday worshipers discredited its claim that it would be unacceptable to
compromise compelling state interests to similarly accommodate Saturday worshipers.
See id. at 406.
57. See id. at 410.
58. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
5 9. See id. at 221.
60. See id. at 213-14 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
61. See id. at 234-35.
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to vaccination exemptions. Rather, precedent suggests that vaccination
exemptions would not be required, even if Sherbert and Yoder were
read to provide free exercise protection against generally applicable
laws.62 But under current law it is a moot question whether the
compelling interest test, properly applied, would require religious
exemptions from generally applicable vaccination requirements.
In Smith, the Court rejected the respondents' claim that Sherbertand
Yoder are controlling in cases where a generally applicable law
burdens religious freedom.63 The Court distinguished Smith from
Sherbert(an unemployment case) by framing the issue at hand in terms
of criminal rather than unemployment law.6 Specifically, the Court
inquired whether the Free Exercise Clause permits the State of Oregon
to include religiously inspired peyote use within the prohibitions of a
criminal statute. 65 The Court ruled that the prohibition was permissible
as applied to ritual peyote use and that the State was not required to
present a compelling state interest to justify the generally applicable
law.66 Further, the Court distinguished between free exercise
challenges to generally applicable laws involving only religious
freedom, and cases where a right in addition to religious freedom is at
stake. In making this distinction, the Court found that Yoder involved
the right to educate one's own child in addition to religious freedom.67
Thus, outside the unemployment context and against generally
applicable laws, Smith limited free exercise protection under the
compelling interest test to cases in which a right in addition to religious
freedom is at stake. 68

62. See supra note 42. Notwithstanding these cases from the state courts citing
Jacobson, at least one Supreme Court Justice has questioned whether a vaccination
requirement would survive a free exercise challenge under the compelling interest test.
See Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
888-89 (1990).
63. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85.
64. See id. at 884. The Court justifies this distinction with the assertion that
exemptions for unemployment compensation are more amenable to individual
assessment; however, the facts in Smith do relate primarily to unemployment
compensation. See id. The Court's characterization of the issues in terms of criminal
law does not make the case any less amenable to individual assessment than other
unemployment cases. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CI. L. REV. 1109, 1123-24 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell,
Revisionism].

65. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 881.
68. See id. at 881-82.
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Some commentators have criticized the Smith opinion for this
characterization of precedent.' The Court's effort to limit the reach of
Sherbert by asserting that Yoder treated free exercise and the right to
direct the education of one's children as independent constitutional
claims seems contrived, particularly given the fact that the Yoder Court
clearly states that parents have no constitutional right to direct their
children's education outside the First Amendment.7' Perhaps the most
incredible case to which the Court cited is Minersville School District
v. Gobitis,7 ' standing for the proposition that the Court has "never
held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law

.

*72

Not only is this assertion

inaccurate,73 but the Court also failed to acknowledge that this case,
which permitted the prosecution of school children for their religiously
motivated refusal to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, was overruled
three years later. 74
The Smith Court's use of precedent and the lengths it went to isolate
the Sherbert model of religious accommodation drew an unusually
strong response from scholars, interest groups, and lawmakers.75
After a period of bipartisan negotiations, Congress responded by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"). 7 6

The general purpose of this legislation was "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.

.

. and to guarantee its

application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened. 77 Although RFRA was generally implemented by the
courts, litigants and commentators frequently challenged its
69. See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 64, at 1123.
70. See id. at 1121 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).
71. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
73. Yoder is a primary example of a case in which the Court found that a free exercise
required an exemption from an otherwise valid generally applicable law. See
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 64, at 1120 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220
(1972)).
74. See id. at 1124 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)).
75. See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); McConnell, Revisionism, supra
note 64; Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (1991).
76. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(iv)
(1994), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb-4 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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constitutionality. 78 The Supreme Court ultimately weighed in,
reaffirming its opinion in Smith, and striking down RFRA as
exceeding Congress' enforcement powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 79
In City of Boerne v. Flores,80 the Archbishop of San Antonio filed
suit in federal court seeking relief from the City of Boerne's refusal to
grant a building permit, which he had requested in order for St. Peter
Catholic Church to proceed with plans to enlarge the sanctuary. The
Archbishop relied substantially upon RFRA to support his claim that
the City had improperly denied his application for a building permit.
The district court denied the Archbishop's claim for relief, finding
RFRA to be an unconstitutional extension of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers.8 ' The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, finding RFRA to be
constitutional. 82 The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, citing
Marbury v. Madison in its ruling that Congress had exceeded its
78. Some circuit courts have affirmed the constitutionality of RFRA outside of the
prisoner's rights context. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Flores v. City of Boeme, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997); see, e.g., In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (implying the
constitutionality of RFRA by applying it retroactively to find that the recovery of
church contributions in a bankruptcy proceeding violates RFRA), vacated by mem.,
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997); Cheema v.
Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (implying the constitutionality of RFRA by
applying the Act to enjoin the school district's enforcement of a weapons ban against
students whose religious beliefs required them to carry ceremonial knives); Droz v.
Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996)
(implying the constitutionality of RFRA by finding that denial of the religious
exemption from participation in Social Security System did not violate taxpayers' First
Amendment rights).
For arguments that RFRA is unconstitutional, see Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545,
1557 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (1996);
Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (N.D. Md. 1996); and Christopher L.
Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is
Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994).
79. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997). The Court set forth
the Fourteenth Amendment in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
. . . The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §§ 2, 5).
80. 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1997).
81. See id. at 2172.
82. See id. at 2160 (citing Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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authority with RFRA by attempting to enact an interpretation of, rather
than enforce constitutional guarantees. 83
Though at least eight of the current Supreme Court Justices agree
that RFRA was constitutionally defective, a minority would rehear the
case, ordering the parties to argue the free exercise issues presented in
Smith.8n Although this minority points to a tension in free exercise
jurisprudence between Smith and the free exercise analysis set forth in
Sherbert and Yoder, the safest operating assumption is that religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws will remain a matter of
legislative discretion rather than constitutional mandate.
Given the near certainty that vaccination exemptions will not be
constitutionally required, the remaining First Amendment inquiry is
whether, and on what terms, the Establishment Clause permits
religious exemptions to vaccination requirements.
B. Establishment
Establishment Clause doctrine determines whether a religious
exemption to a generally applicable law is constitutionally permissible
and, if so, how inclusively exemption eligibility must be defined."
Establishment permissibility and exemption eligibility are critical
factors in examining the merits of vaccination exemptions. If religious
exemptions are permissible based upon broadly defined eligibility,
then a vaccination exemption may permit population immunity within
subgroups to be significantly reduced, thereby compromising public
health goals.
The main reference point for modern establishment doctrine is
Lemon v. Kurtzman.86 In Lemon, the Court rejected a Rhode Island
plan to supplement the salaries of classroom instructors teaching only
nonreligious courses in private schools, including sectarian
institutions. 87 The Court found that the inquiries necessary to ensure
that public funds were not used for religious purposes would entangle
m The Lemon Court put forth a
state power with religious authority.8
83. See id. at 2172 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
84. See id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's dissent.
85. The following discussion of Corporationof the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) and Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1986) elicits this point. See infra notes 93-106 and
accompanying text.
86. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
87. See id. at 607-09.
88. See id. at 619.
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three-part test to determine whether a state action violates the
Establishment Clause. "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
8 9
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'
Though a lively debate persists about whether and to what extent the
Lemon test should remain in force, 9° the Court continues to cite the
case as authority. 9 As the following discussion shows, the Court
tends to interpret Lemon in ways that give states more latitude to enact
religious92 exemptions than a strict reading of the opinion might
suggest.

Perhaps the clearest example of this tendency is Corporationof the
PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 93 in which the Court upheld an exemption provided exclusively
for religious organizations. In the context of a complaint brought by a
maintenance worker whom the church fired for not being a member,
the Amos Court considered whether a Title V11 94 exemption for
religious organizations from the prohibition against religiously
motivated employment discrimination violates the Establishment
Clause. The Court held that the exemption did not violate the
establishment principles in Lemon.95 Specifically, the Court held that
the exemption satisfied the first principle in Lemon (that of serving a
secular purpose) by removing the burden of a government regulation
from religious employment decisions.' The Court also stated that the
89. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
90. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795
(1993); Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L.REV. 883 (1993).
91. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2000-01 (1997); Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 695 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1, 5 (1993).
92. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
93. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
94. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-I (1994).
95. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339. Amos is distinctive because in it the Court for the
first time upheld the constitutionality of a statutory exemption directed exclusively at
religious organizations. Prior to Amos, exemptions that passed Establishment Clause
muster were directed at a more generalizable body of beneficiaries. See, e.g., Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for property used
exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes). The Amos Court noted
that the statute was neutral as between religions. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 339. Had the
statute not been facially neutral, it would have been impermissible under establishment
principles. See id. For Supreme Court authority on this point, see Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
96. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-36.
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statute satisfied the second Lemon requirement (that of neither
advancing nor inhibiting religion) in that the exemption merely allows
religion to more effectively advance its own causes.9 7 The Court
observed that exempting religious organizations from government
regulation prevents church-state entanglement (the third Lemon
requirement).98 Though Amos is significant because it upholds an
exemption permitted exclusively for religion, it should not be read to
indicate unrestrained Establishment Clause permissiveness.
One of the more significant cases since Amos in setting some
establishment parameters is Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.99 In
Texas Monthly, the Court held that a sales and use tax exemption
exclusively for religious periodicals violated the Establishment Clause
because it favored religious over secular interests and unjustifiably
0
burdened nonbeneficiaries."'
The Court noted that the secular
purpose requirement in Lemon forbids the state from using its power
and prestige to advance or inhibit religion in general, or one religion
over another.' 0 ' The Court, however, was clear in saying that
exemptions benefiting only religious organizations may be permissible
if the exemption does not impose an unjustifiable burden upon
nonbeneficiaries.10 2 In thus clarifying, the Court distinguished
between Texas Monthly and Amos on the basis that in Amos the
exemption prevented substantial intrusions into religious freedom. 3
The Texas Monthly court found no such intrusion in the requirement
that religious periodicals pay taxes."°
Taken together, Amos and Texas Monthly can be used as precedent
to support the claim that religious exemptions to vaccination
requirements are permissible under establishment analysis if the
exemption is facially neutral among religions, and if the burdens
removed from religious freedom are sufficient to justify the burdens
imposed upon nonbeneficiaries.' 0 5 The facial neutrality requirement,
that an exemption not favor one religion over another, is borne out in
lower court decisions holding that vaccination exemptions offered only
to members of an organized religion are invalid under the
97. See id. at 336-37.
98. See id. at 339.
99. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
100. See id. at 14-15, 18 n.8.
101. See id. at 8-9.
102. See id. at 18 n.8.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 18.
105. See id. at 18 n.8.
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Establishment Clause."° Although case law clearly demonstrates the
facial neutrality requirement, there is no precedent on the precise
question of whether vaccination exemptions provide a sufficient
benefit to religious interests to justify the burden of reduced population
immunity. However, the burdens that vaccination exemptions remove
from religious practice are significant, and they almost certainly would
satisfy the standard set forth in Amos and Texas Monthly.
Given the requirement that religious exemptions must extend equally
to all religions, exemption eligibility will be determined largely by how
one defines religion. Two formative cases in the definition of religion
are Welsh v. United States10 7 and United States v. Seeger.0 8 The
relevant issue in these cases is whether the statutory exemption for
conscientious objector status impermissibly favors one religion over
another, or religion over nonreligion, if it allows exemption for
persons with a "belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being"' and denies
exemption for those whose objections are "'political, sociological, or
philosophical. "'
Justice Harlan addressed this point extensively in his concurring
opinion in Welsh.' His opinion states that the government is free to
choose whether or not to offer exemptions, but if it chooses to create
an exemption, the Establishment Clause constrains the government
from distinguishing between theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs,
or between religious and secular beliefs."' In Welsh, the Court ruled
that those who object to combat service on the basis of moral or ethical
beliefs that are "held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions" are not made ineligible for exemption by the statutory
language excluding those whose objections are essentially "political,
106. Courts ruling on the issue differ on whether to sever and invalidate an
unconstitutionally narrow exemption, thus requiring all persons to be vaccinated, or to
expand the exemption to bring it into compliance with the Establishment Clause.
Compare Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964);
Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) with Davis v. State, 451 A.2d
107 (Md. 1982); Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971); Brown v. Stone,
378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979).
107. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
108. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
109. Id. at 165-66 (quoting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50
U.S.C. § 4560) (1958)).
110. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 345.
111. See id. at 356-57 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970));
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (remaining citations
omitted).
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sociological, or philosophical." ' 1 2 In Seeger, the Court held that
religious belief as belief in a "Supreme Being" includes convictions
that have a theocentric as well as anthropocentric basis. 13 Though the
Court does not itself define religion, it does establish very inclusive
boundaries by quoting passages from the writings of theologians
including Paul Tillich.'
The point to be drawn from Seeger and
Welsh is that in order for an exemption statute to be permissible under
the Establishment Clause, the exemption must define religion broadly
enough to include nontheistic religions as well as those moral and
ethical beliefs that are maintained with strength similar to that of
traditional religion." 5 These broad parameters for exemption
eligibility exacerbate the tension between religious freedom and public
health. As exemption eligibility increases, so will the number of
successful applicants, thereby reducing the level of protection against
disease within a population.
112. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339-42.
113. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
114. See id. at 180-87. Paul Tillich is quoted for writing:
I have written of the God above the God of theism .... In such a state (of selfaffirmation) the God of both religious and theological language disappears.
But something remains, namely, the seriousness of that doubt in which
meaning within meaninglessness is affirmed. The source of this affirmation
of meaning within meaninglessness, of certitude within doubt, is not the God
of traditional theism but the "God above God," the power of being, which
works through those who have no name for it, not even the name God.
Id. at 180 (quoting PAULTILLICH, II SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957)).
And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of
the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern,
of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so,
you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God ....
Id. at 187 (quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)).
Separately, Franklin Gamwell, Professor, University of Chicago Divinity School,
seeks to define religion by identifying "what all religious convictions have in
common." Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L &
RELIGION 325, 326 (1984). He identifies this as "the affirmation of a comprehensive or
all-inclusive purpose or ideal for human life. 'Comprehensive' or 'all-inclusive' here
means a purpose to which all others are properly subservient. . . ." Id.
115. The Court has not defined the strength with which traditional religious
convictions are maintained. Personal convictions about traditional religious subjects
range from the absolute to the very tentative, suggesting that a person could be very
unsure about his or her ethical or moral position and still qualify for a religious
exemption-a suggestion that would probably not be very convincing to the Court. In
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944), the Court reversed the decision to
submit the question of the sincerity of religious belief to the trier of fact. This is one
step removed from, and perhaps less intrusive, than an inquiry into the strength with
which religious beliefs are held. Even so, some question the wisdom of a judicial inquiry
into the sincerity of religious proclamation. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., How
Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L REV. 713 (1988).
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Broad parameters also make it difficult for the courts to reasonably
distinguish between religion and nonreligion.1 6 This is demonstrated
by two federal court cases that encountered difficulty in interpreting
New York's vaccination exemption statute." 7 In Mason v. General
Brown Central School District,"8 the Second Circuit ruled upon an
exemption claim made by two parents on their son's behalf, pursuant
to the New York exemption statute. The appellate court interpreted the
statute to permit exemption on the basis of sincere religious belief
without regard to church affiliation," 9 but it denied relief to the
petitioners on the basis that their objections were philosophical and not
religious. The parents' petition claimed that vaccinations are
prohibited by their belief in a "natural existence."' 20 Though the court
did not question the sincerity with which the parents maintained their
beliefs, it ruled that the petitioners' beliefs reflected a secular lifestyle
choice that did not qualify for religious exemption.' 2' Given the
116. Commentators point to the complexity of distinguishing between religion and
nonreligion. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the
ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
117. The New York statute in 1985 provided: "No principal, teacher, owner or
person in charge of a school shall permit any child to be admitted to such school, or to
attend such school in excess of fourteen days, without the certificate ... of the child's
immunization against poliomyelitis, mumps, measles, diphtheria, [and] rubella.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7) (McKinney 1985). It goes on to say:
This section shall not apply to children whose parent, parents, or guardian are
bonafide members of a recognized religious organization whose teachings are
contrary to the practices herein required, and no certificate shall be required as
a prerequisite to such children being admitted or received into school or
attending school.
Id. § 2164(9).
118. 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
119. The Mason court noted:
that the clause in section 2164(9) requiring that parents who seek an
exemption be "bona fide members of a recognized religious organization" has
been held unconstitutional, see Scherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free
Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), and that the state has determined
it will not appeal ....As a result, pursuant to New York's separability statute,
[citation omitted] the 'recognized religious organization' clause is
automatically excised from subsection 9, leaving a general exemption for any
person whose opposition to immunization stems from a sincere religious
belief.
Mason, 851 F.2d at 54 (quoting Scherr, 672 F. Supp. at 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
120. See id. at49.
121. See id. at 52-53. Though the court affirmed its belief in the petitioners'
sincerity, it gave some attention to the fact that the petitioners' affiliation with the
Universal Life Church, which has no rights of membership, offers ecclesiastical titles
through the mail for a specified fee. See id. at 53. One must question whether the
petitioners' cause was prejudiced by this affiliation, regardless of personal beliefs.
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court's focus on the secular nature of the petitioners' beliefs, one
might question whether the court would have granted the exemption if
the petitioners had made reference to a transcendent reality.
Lewis v. Sobol, read in conjunction with Mason, suggests that
courts may look for some references to a transcendent reality when
deciding whether particular beliefs are religious, notwithstanding
Seeger and Welsh, which explicitly include philosophical beliefs for
exemption eligibility. 22 In Lewis v. Sobol, 123 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York considered
whether the petitioners' belief in a "natural order" and awareness of the
"spirituality of the land" qualified as religion for purposes of a
vaccination exemption.1 24 The court found that the petitioners'
lifestyle and opposition to vaccinations were informed by "ultimate
concerns" and therefore qualified for religious exemption. 25 Given
the broad definition of religion in Seeger, which includes both spiritual
and philosophical ultimate concerns, it is not clear that a meaningful
distinction can be made between the beliefs held by Lewis (a general
spirituality) and those held by the Masons (philosophical). Either may
be taken by the holder as a source of comprehensive and ultimate
authority. The Lewis court's distinction between spiritually and
biologically-based beliefs is unconvincing. Biological claims can be
just as authoritative for the claimant as spiritual beliefs, even if the
biology is demonstrably mistaken. 26 And it would surely risk
entanglement with religion for the state to move beyond assessing
sincerity of belief into the area of assessing the relative authority that
petitioners grant to their respective beliefs. 27
These cases demonstrate how difficult it is to develop a definition of
religion that establishes meaningful parameters for exemption
eligibility. A clear reading of Welsh and Seeger shows that religious
exemption statutes must be written and interpreted broadly enough to
include all persons whose objections are based upon a belief in, what
is for the believer, a source of ultimate authority. This type of broad
122. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-86; Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 339-42 (citing Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184-86).
123. 710 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
124. See id. at 507-08.
125. See id. at 515.
126. For example, "creationist science," whether or not factually accurate, is often
essential to an adherent's perception of the world and the nature of authority in his life.
See JAMES GUSTAFSON, INTERSECTIONS: SCIENCE, THEOLOGY, AND ETHICS 1-2 (1996).
127. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text; See also Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (holding that political division along religious lines was one of the
principal dangers that the First Amendment was intended to guard against).
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exemption eligibility creates obvious tensions between religious
freedom and public health. Present legislation, of which the New
York statute is typical, has not resolved the tension. This suggests that
policy and/or administrative changes will be necessary to reach a more
optimal balance between public health and religious freedom.
V.

BALANCING INTERESTS IN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PUBLIC
HEALTH

The central interests in religious freedom and public health in the
vaccination context are, respectively, the freedom to practice religion
without interference or penalty, and that no person should suffer
illness unnecessarily. The task of this section is to identify a method
and examine practical alternatives by which these interests can be more
optimally balanced.
Theoretically, one can approach an optimal balance between
competing interests by advancing each to a point where any additional
benefit to one will cause a greater burden for the other.' 28 A
significant difficulty in applying this theory to religious freedom and
public health is that it often will involve a comparison of
incommensurables. Religious and public health interests have very
different guiding principles and refer to different standards to measure
marginal benefit. Although each particular religion focuses on some
ultimate authority to receive or develop guiding principles, public
health policy refers to physical health and contingent political
authority. Although it is true that religion may influence public policy,
it is not contained within public policy. Stated differently, government
may take into account the positions advanced by religious advocates,
but public policy cannot adopt all of the policies advanced by religious
and secular interests on a particular point. This leads to a tension
between interest groups that cannot be resolved without a common
moral understanding.
One response to this tension between religious and secular interests
is an accommodationist approach as modeled in Sherbert and Yoder."
128. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). The
optimal outcome is the efficient outcome, which is possible in a world of free trade. It is
the point at which people have maximized their respective benefits in free trade with
other persons. Whether economic theory has developed methods by which one can
accomplish a balancing of incommensurable interests is beyond the scope of this Essay.
129. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (holding that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments do not allow a state to force Amish parents to cause their
children to attend high school through age sixteen, once they have already graduated
from eighth grade); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (holding that
South Carolina could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to a woman who
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Though a Court majority now holds that the SherbertlYoder
compelling interest test no longer extends to First Amendment
challenges to generally applicable laws, the cases do provide a helpful
method of analysis. Under a principle of accommodation, the state
remains attentive to the impact of generally applicable laws such as
vaccination requirements, and it makes conscious efforts to avoid
imposing burdens on religious freedom. 130 This arrangement gives
religious believers maximum freedom to optimize their own interests
on their own terms, permitting state interference only when necessary
to advance or protect a very important state interest. Although in many
cases a policy of accommodation may prevent conflict by giving
conditional deference to religion, it does not resolve the problem of
balancing incommensurables. Accommodation raises the question, but
it does not determine whether a given secular interest is sufficiently
important to justify burdening religious interests that may be at stake.
The fact that both religion and public health acknowledge different
sources of authority makes it difficult to determine precisely how much
weight to give a secular interest as compared to a religious claim. 3
But, a conscientious effort to balance the interests at stake gives
advocates from all perspectives on a particular issue a fair opportunity
to advance their objectives in terms that best express their values. The
approach suggested here is necessarily a democratic process, where
policy decisions are made publicly, and no position enjoys an inherent
advantage. 32 A commitment to a democratic balancing process
implies a willingness to respect the resulting decision, even if contrary
to one's own point of view. 133 This commitment is acceptable because
the balancing process permits choice between competing interests
had refused employment because she would have had to work on Saturday against her
religious beliefs).
130. Accommodation is distinguishable from formal neutrality, where the
government bases "public policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the
religious consequences of its actions." McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 45, at
689.
13 1. "The most difficult aspect of the free exercise balance is assessment of the
weight that should be given to enforcement of the government's policy, as applied to
the religious objector." McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 45, at 736.
132. With this understanding, an optimal balance is one in which religious freedom
is given as much respect as other fundamental rights. This does not mean that religion
should always win, but that it should be considered along with other very important
rights. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 14-16, 145 (1993). Professor
Carter develops the point by suggesting that society, more than the courts, should
"balance the depth of our moral commitment to the policy in question against the value
of religious autonomy." Id. at 145.
133. See FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 166 (1995).
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while respecting the legitimacy of both. To the extent that religious
and secular interests are committed to deciding by a public balancing of
interests, the commitment to the process becomes the common moral
language. It is a language of mutual respect that advocates for either
position are willing to listen to and accommodate the other if reason
and respect suggest that they should.134 In this sense, there can be a
common morality of interaction that goes beyond mere procedure. By
respecting one's own position and the positions of others, religious
and secular interests may be able to balance the otherwise
incommensurable interests at stake.
The strongest objection to a democratic balancing of interests is that
it has obvious majoritarian implications. The concerns of a small
minority religion, regardless of the openness of the balancing process,
may be consistently subordinated to more widely held claims. The
strongest response to this is that the alternatives to democracy tend
either toward anarchy or tyranny.135 But this fact provides no absolute
assurance of fairness; it simply points out that an accommodationist
democracy is the best of an imperfect set of alternatives. However, a
balancing process based upon mutual respect suggests that a majority
may, or perhaps should, defer to a minority on a point of great
importance to that minority, even if the minority position is slightly
offensive to the majority, and even though the Free Exercise Clause
does not require accommodation. The choice of forty-eight states to
provide religious exemptions to vaccination requirements reflects this
sort of choice by the majority to defer to a minority. This is a laudable
effort by the states to optimize the balance between religious freedom
and public health. However, accommodation alone will not generate a
more optimal balance if either public health or religious interests are
unnecessarily compromised.
The remaining part of this section is directed toward an assessment
of alternatives to optimize the balance between religious freedom and
public health in the context of immunization policy, taking into account
the concerns of the parties most affected: individual children, parents,
and the general public. The guiding principle here is that neither
religious freedom nor public health gets absolute priority. There are
occasions when religious freedom must yield to the exigencies of
organized society, and there are times when organized society's
commitment to religious freedom requires accommodation of minority
134. See DAVID TRAcY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY 19 (1987).
135. Reinhold Niebuhr states: "[The] twin evils, tyranny and anarchy, represent the
Scylla and Charybdis between which the frail bark of social justice must sail." REINHOLD
NEIBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION 258 (1964).
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religions. With this understanding, an optimal balance is one in which
religious freedom is taken as seriously and given as much respect as
other important interests and fundamental rights.' 3
The first, and perhaps most likely, legislative alternative is to
maintain the status quo that exists in the majority of states: a general
requirement that all children receive a standard series of vaccinations
before entering school, from which persons with religious objections
can apply for exemption. As suggested above, this alternative causes
problems for both religious freedom and public health. Public health
may be poorly served if exempt children become infected and spread37
disease among exempt and otherwise underimmunized persons.'
Conversely, religious freedom may be poorly served if parents whose
beliefs fail to qualify them for exemption can be subject to criminal
prosecution. 3 8 The most obvious way to relieve the burden on one
interest results in increasing the burden on the other interest. That is,
broadening exemption eligibility to include all sincere objections
minimizes the possibility that a religious objection will be incorrectly
denied, but it increases the burden on public health. Conversely,
repeal of religious exemptions might advance the public health, but not
without increasing the burden on religious freedom. As a result,
neither of these solutions improves the suboptimal status quo-they
merely reallocate the burdens.
A second alternative is to repeal religious exemptions and all
punitive measures for parental noncompliance with vaccination
requirements. Under this alternative, the public health authorities
39
would vaccinate school children, with or without parental consent.
This alternative has two benefits. First, it protects the public health by
eliminating the pockets of disease vulnerability that exist among
exempt populations. Second, it reduces the burden on parents who
otherwise would be penalized for refusing consent for their child's
vaccination. Because their consent becomes unnecessary, parents
would not be forced to choose between their religious beliefs and legal
interests.
However, even if parental consent is not required, significant
burdens remain. First, parents who anticipate a religiously
136. See CARTER, supra note 132.
137. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
139. This would require appointment of a public guardian for the limited purpose of
consenting to a vaccination. For an example of this approach, see Mannis v. State, 398
S.W.2d 206 (Ark. 1966) (appointment of temporary guardian for purposes of
vaccinating children and enrolling them in school).
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objectionable vaccination might keep their child' from attending school
where the vaccinations most likely would be imposed. In such a case,
parents could be criminally prosecuted for causing their child's
truancy, thereby suffering an indirect burden on their religious
practice." However, a very direct burden on religious freedom is
eliminated in that parents would not be prosecuted as a direct
consequence of refusing to consent. Second, and the more onerous
burden, is the fact that some religions may consider vaccination to be
so offensive that a vaccinated child is no longer acceptable to the
parents and thus may be abandoned.' 4 ' Such cases are unusual; while
the beliefs that precipitate such a response may be extreme, the burden
imposed is also extreme. These burdens must be taken seriously in
any effort to reach an optimal balance, but in the absence of a better
alternative, they do not preclude a policy of vaccinating children
without parental consent.
A third alternative is to permit exemption for children who engage in
home-schooling or attend private schools that explicitly permit
unvaccinated children. This policy would give religious parents an
option to maintain their religious integrity without imposing a
significant burden on them.'42 There are two significant problems
with this alternative. First, it would create underimmunized subpopulations by giving parents an incentive to put their children into
schools with a high proportion of unimmunized students. Children in
home-schooling also would be at risk to the extent that they associate
with unimmunized persons, most likely in worship or other religious
gatherings. A provision permitting the public health authorities to
vaccinate in the event of an epidemic would be of limited utility
because the disease already has spread by the time symptoms
appear.' 43 Another significant problem is that it is divisive and
stigmatizing to give parents a clear incentive to segregate. When
parents are forced to choose between consenting to a religiously
prohibited vaccination and segregating their child, those who can
afford to segregate are likely to do so. Segregationist incentives fail to
optimize the public well-being, either socially or epidemiologically.
140. See supra notes 27-28.
141. See Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ark. 1964) (including testimony by
the father that he will not accept his children if they are vaccinated).
142. The burden on religious freedom is similar to the burden of a religiously
objectionable curriculum; parents who object to the conditions at public schools may
choose to send their children elsewhere.
143. Post-exposure vaccinations can protect against some diseases. For example, a
measles vaccination may prevent or modify the course of the disease if given within six
days of exposure. See EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION, supra note 12, at 99.
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Although each of these alternatives to the status quo offer to protect
one interest and mitigate the burdens on the other, neither is entirely
successful. Both impose burdens upon either religious freedom or
public health that are unacceptable if they can be reasonably avoided.
A more optimal solution would enhance both sets of interests while
imposing minimal burdens.
A legislative and executive policy that vigorously promotes
voluntary vaccinations is an alternative that offers to enhance both
religious freedom and public health without burdening either. This is
perhaps the most obvious way to reduce the tension between religious
freedom and public health because it improves one without imposing
on the other. However, this solution has proven difficult to
implement. This can be seen in the development of federal legislation
providing free distribution of pediatric vaccines to qualifying primary
care providers who may charge a fee only to cover the cost of
administering the vaccine."
Children qualify for these low-cost
vaccines if they are on Medicaid, have no insurance coverage for
vaccinations, or if they are American Indian. 4 5
There are a number of problems with the program that may explain
its incomplete success. First, although a participating provider may
not refuse to vaccinate a child who is unable to pay the cost of
administration,6' not all financially needy parents necessarily will

know this; and, even if they do know it, the prospect of asking for a
fee waiver may be a deterrent itself. Another possible hindrance to the
program's success is that physicians may be discouraged from
participating because of the requirements that they determine whether
the child qualifies for the vaccination program by inquiring with the
child's parent or guardian, and that they keep records of each child's
qualifying status.' 47 If qualifying children are discouraged by
administrative fees, and if physicians are disenchanted with
administrative requirements, many children may be pushed back to the
often inconvenient and overcrowded public clinics. For these and
other reasons, the initiative that was intended to have increased the
vaccination rate among two-year-old children to ninety percent by the
year 19968 remains unfinished.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a), (c), (d) (1996).
145. See id. § 1396s(b)(2)(A).
146. See id. § 1396s(c)(2)(C)(iii).
147. See id. § 1396s(c)(2)(A); Gary Freed & Samuel Katz, The Comprehensive
Childhood Immunization Act of 1993: Toward a More Rational Approach, 329 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1957, 1958 (1993).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a), (c), (d).
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Given the incomplete success of this ambitious plan, a practical
question remains as to whether voluntary vaccination programs can be
reasonably expected to meet the established public health goals. The
successes of earlier vaccination programs, such as the campaign
against polio, shows that an adequately mobilized public can achieve
remarkable results. 149 Such prior success suggests that a more
efficient voluntary vaccination program could significantly improve the
population immunity.
In light of this assessment, how should religious freedom and
public health be balanced? A public health advocate might suggest that
it would be most prudent to repeal vaccination exemptions, at least
until the goal of vaccinating ninety percent of the nation's two-yearolds has been met. Although such a proposal shows admirable
impulses, it permits political and administrative ineptitude to displace
important religious interests."5 It is one thing to suggest that religious
interests should defer to public health interests when all reasonable
efforts have been made to advance the public health. It is quite another
to claim that re!igious freedom should be subordinated to
administrative and political shortcomings. A fairer policy would be to
permit the exemptions to remain while public health advocates unify
around the cause of voluntary vaccination. If, despite such efforts, an
appreciable risk of disease remains, then the state may have a morally
defensible claim to vaccinate over religious objection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A more optimal balance between public health and religious freedom
can be approached through aggressive campaigns to promote voluntary
vaccination while continuing to permit religious exemptions. Such a
policy respects both religious freedom and public health. Public health
interests are clearly advanced by increasing voluntary immunization
rates. A small number of unvaccinated children in a highly immunized
society should not be at significant risk, nor should they present a
significant health threat to others. Religious freedom is enhanced by
continuing to permit exemptions, and removing punitive sanctions for
persons whose objections are judged, correctly or not, to be
nonreligious. In this way, something close to an optimal balance can
be reached. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses clearly
149. Center for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv.,
Update: Childhood Vaccine-Preventable Diseases-UnitedStates, 1994, 43 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 718, 718 (1994).

150. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
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permit this balance. Whether politics can produce such a solution is
uncertain. However, the combined energies of religious and public
health advocates may be sufficient to initiate some positive change.
But even with the most effective vaccination campaign, some
children will become ill with the targeted diseases. This will be the
case until the diseases are eradicated. Until such time, questions will
remain. How many cases of disease is too many? How many sick
children does it take to justify an imposition on religious freedom? To
these questions neither religious nor public health interests speaking
alone can provide the answer. The optimum is found in a balanced
respect for each.

